By: Mukoda Sarah
The Protection of Sovereignty Bill, 2026 represents one of the most far-reaching legislative attempts in recent Ugandan history to regulate the interface between domestic governance and external influence. At its conceptual core, the Bill is anchored in a legitimate state interest, the preservation of national sovereignty in an increasingly globalised world where foreign actors, state and non-state, play significant roles in shaping domestic policy, economic trajectories, and civic discourse. The memorandum to the Bill underscores concerns regarding foreign interference in Uganda’s political and socio-economic landscape, particularly through civil society, digital platforms, and conditional foreign aid. However, while the objective may be defensible, the legal architecture adopted by the Bill raises profound constitutional, statutory, and jurisprudential concerns. A meticulous analysis reveals that the Bill, in its current form, risks undermining the very sovereignty it seeks to protect by eroding constitutional guarantees, duplicating existing regulatory regimes, and departing from both Ugandan and regional jurisprudence on fundamental rights and the rule of law.
The Bill begins by invoking Article 1 of the Constitution, affirming that sovereignty belongs to the people of Uganda. Yet, this invocation is more symbolic than substantive. Clause 5 of the Bill criminalises any activity that promotes the interests of a foreigner against those of Uganda, imposing severe penalties including imprisonment of up to twenty years. The difficulty lies not in the protection of national interest per se, but in the absence of a clear and objective standard for determining what constitutes “the interests of Uganda.” This ambiguity creates a dangerous legal terrain where enforcement is left to subjective executive interpretation. Ugandan jurisprudence has consistently rejected such indeterminacy. In Salvatori Abuki & Another v Attorney General, Constitutional Appeal No. 1 of 1998, the Supreme Court emphasised that laws must be clear, certain, and predictable, particularly where they impose criminal liability. The Court warned against legislative provisions that confer excessive discretion on state authorities, noting that such laws are incompatible with constitutionalism. By failing to define key operative terms, the Bill transforms the concept of sovereignty from a constitutional principle grounded in popular will into an elastic instrument of executive control.
This concern is further amplified when one considers the Bill’s expansive criminal provisions. Clause 13 introduces the offence of “economic sabotage,” defined broadly to include any publication or activity that weakens or damages the economic system or viability of the country. Similarly, Clause 12 prohibits “interference with operations of Government,” while Clause 11 criminalises influence over electoral processes by agents of foreigners. These provisions are drafted in sweeping terms that lack the precision required of penal legislation. Article 28(12) of the Constitution mandates that no person shall be convicted of a criminal offence unless the offence is clearly defined and the penalty prescribed by law. The Constitutional Court in Olum & Another v Attorney General [2002] 2 EA 508 (CCU) held that vague and overly broad laws violate this principle and are therefore unconstitutional. More recently, in Andrew Karamagi & Another v Attorney General, Constitutional Petition No. 5 of 2018, the Court struck down provisions of the Computer Misuse Act for vagueness, reiterating that criminal statutes must provide clear guidance to citizens on prohibited conduct. The Sovereignty Bill, by employing indeterminate language such as